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The Effects of Reference Groups
on Bargaining in Coalition Situations
Abstract
The predictions of four theories of coalition behavior were compared
to the results obtained from three coalition games conducted under two
reference group conditions. Participants were instructed to establish
a reference group composed of the other members of their group or players
in other groups in the same position as themselves. While the different
games had an impact on the accuracy of the theoretical predictions, the
data as a whole tended to support Bargaining theory (Komorita and Chertkof f,
1973) and the Weighted Probability model (Komorita, 1974) over Minimum
Resource theory (Gamson, 1961) and Minimum Power theory (Shapley and
Shubik, 1954). The results also indicated that a reference group of
other similai players led to higher ] ayoffs and a higher inclusion rate
for the powerful player in each of the games, even though his demands
were higher in these conditions. The use of four-person coalition
games in coalition research was also discussed.
-
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The Effects of Reference Groups
on Bargaining in Coalition Situations
The study of coalition behavior has recently been enchanced by several
new theories (e.g., Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; Komorita, 1974; Lawler
and Youngs, 1975). In addition, several earlier theories (e.g., Caplow,
1956; Gamson, 1961; Shapley and Shubik, 1954) have continued to be
mentioned in the literature. It might be seriously argued that the study
of coalition behavior suffers from too many theories and too little
empirical research (Davis, Laughlin, and Komorita, 1976) . The present
paper offers data to begin to fill this void and addresses both new and
old theories.
Almost all theories of coalition behavior assume that participants
attempt to maximize outcomes. However, several studies (e.g., Kalisch,
Milnor, Nash, and Nering, 1954; Stryker and Psathas, 1960; Trost, 1965;
Vinacke, 1959) have noted a tendency of some participants to exhibit
cooperative behavior. Although studies generally include instructions
which encourage participants to maximize their rewards, these instructions
may not be sufficient to instill a completely competitive spirit in the
players. The present study was designed, in part, to test the hypothesis
that the manipulation of an individual's reference group (Kelley, 1952)
determines an individual's comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959),
which in turn may determine whether he adopts a competitive or cooperative
orientation.
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An individual who holds a powerful position and whose reference
group is the other members in his own group will be able to maintain
his "superiority" (Laing and Morrison, 1974) even though he may allow
the weaker members of his group to obtain payoffs which are more than
the equity norm (Adams, 1965; Gamson, 1961) might predict. In other
situations, however, an individual in a powerful position may compare
himself to individuals in other groups who also hold powerful positions.
In this case, the powerful person will be motivated to extract the
maximum he can from the payoffs which are available to his group, thus
increasing his power relative to the leaders of these other groups.
A political example of this type of individual might be a prime minister,
a dictator or a president. If his reference group consists of other
prime ministers, dictators, or presidents, he may attempt to increase
his power relative to these other individuals at the expense of the
people in his country (i.e., his group). Presidents of industrial
firms, labor unions, and chairmen of financial institutions and uni-
versity departments may experience these same motivations (Marris, 1963).
The study was also designed to compare the accuracy of the predictions
of four descriptive theories of coalition behavior. The present study was
conducted, therefore, to answer two questions: (1) What are the effects
of an individual's reference group in bargaining situations? And (2)
Which of the relevant theories of coalition behavior adequately predict
coalition behavior, not only with respect to the bargaining outcomes
but also with respect to the bargaining processes which ensue?
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The Theories
Minimum Resource Theory . Gamson's (1961) theory is based on the
"parity norm" which specifies that rewards be divided in direct
proportion to the resources of the members. Assuming that individuals
are motivated to maximize their share of the rewards, the theory predicts
that the coalition which minimizes resources and is just large enough to
win (the "cheapest winning") will form.
Minimum Power Theory . Minimum power theory is based on an index of
pivotal power proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954). Assuming that each
coalition is. equally probable, the pivotal power of a participant is
determined by the marginal value each player adds to each coalition
when he joins it. That coalition with the least total pivotal power
but which still attains a majority is the coalition which is predicted
to form. Minimum power theory implies (Gamson, 1964) that the payoffs
to the coal: tion members will be proportional to each position's pivotal
power.
Bargaining Theory . Compared to the previous theories, the underlying
basis of the Bargaining theory is much more complex. It is one of the
few theories (if not the only one) which makes assumptions about the
process of coalition formation and makes differential predictions for
the initial trial and at the asymptotic level. At the asymptote, the
theory predicts that the division of rewards will converge to a solution
which minimizes each member's temptation to defect from the coalition.
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In general, Bargaining theory predicts that rewards will be divided in
direct proportion to each member's maximum expectation in alternative
coalitions. For a more detailed description of the theory, the reader
is referred to the paper by Komorita and Chertkoff (1973).
The Weighted Probability Model . The basic assumption underlying the
Weighted Probability model is that large coalitions are more difficult
to form than small ones. As the size of a potential coalition increases,
the problem of achieving reciprocity and achieving unanimous agreement
on the terms of the offer also increases. This is consistent with the
inverse relationship between group size and the cohesiveness of a group
reported by Cartwright and Zander (1968)
.
The theory predicts, therefore, that only minimal winning coalitions
will form—a winning coalition in which the deletion of any single member
will convert it into a losing coalition. This assumption is consistent
with Garrison* s Minimum Resource theory. However, unlike Garrison's theory
which focuses on the resource distribution and predicts that the "cheapest
winning" coalition will form (one which is just large enough to win) , the
Weighted Probability model predicts that the coalitions of minimum size
will form more frequently than larger "cheapest winning" coalitions.
Method
Subjects
. The subjects were 168 male undergraduates, predominantly
juniors, enrolled in an introductory course in organizational behavior.
Each received credit toward completion of a course requirement for
participating in the study.
'
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Design . Two variables were manipulated: The player's reference
group (by means of instructions) and the distribution of resources of
the players (by means of three different games) . Each of the coalition
games involved four-person groups, and the possible winning coalitions
in the three games were identical. The games were as follows: 9(8-3-3-3),
9(8-7-1-1), and 15(8-7-7-7), where the first number denotes the number of
votes needed to form a winning (majority) coalition, and the subsequent
numbers denote the number of votes (resources) at the disposal of the
players. If the players are identified by letter (A, B, C, and D) on
the basis of decreasing order of resources seven winning coalitions are
possible in each of the games: AB, AC, AD, ABC, ABD, ACD, and BCD. The
"grand coalition" of four players was not permitted. Table 1 shows the
predictions of the four theories of coalition formation for the three
games. The theories make differential predictions for the set of three
Insert Table L about here
games: (1) Minimum Power theory, unlike the other three theories,
uniformly predicts that the Weak-Union (coalition of the three weaker
players) will form; (2) Minimum Resource theory can be differentiated
from the remaining two theories on the basis of the first two games
9(8-3-3-3) and 9(8-7-1-1), and on the basis of the predicted reward
division for 15(8-7-7-7); and (3) the last two theories make very
similar predictions but can be differentiated on the basis of coalition
frequency in 9(8-7-1-1) and on reward division in 15(8-7-7-7).
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For each of the three games, two instructional conditions were
used: one set of instructions was designed to establish the player's
reference group as the other four players who were present at that
particular session, while the second set of instructions was designed
to establish the player's reference group as other players in the same
position as themselves. The reference group of the participants in the
"A" position who heard the "present group" instructions was composed of
four weak players. For the weak players in this condition, their
reference group was composed of one strong and three weak players.
Participants who heard the "similar others" instructions had reference
groups which were identical in power to themselves.
Procedure . The four participants were seated around a set of opaque
partitions which shielded them from view of each other and the experimenter.
The partitions were constructed in the configuration of the "wheel"
communication network (Bavelas, 1951), with the experimenter in the
central position. Each player's position (A, B, C, or D) was randomly
assigned after they were seated behind the partitions. No verbal com-
munication, save procedural questions, was permitted and subjects did
not know which position any other player held.
Each player was required to propose one, and only one, coalition
per trial. Only coalitions with the necessary minimum number of votes
were allowed (i.e., one of the seven possible winning coalitions listed
above). In addition, subjects were not told beforehand how many trials
would be run.
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The reward for forming a winning coalition was 100 points, divided
among the members of the coalition. To make a proposal, each subject
first decided which coalition he wanted to form and how many points of
the total of 100 each member (including himself) should receive. He
then sent an offer slip which contained this information to each of the
other members of the proposed coalition, via the experimenter. The
experimenter waited until all four players had submitted their offer
slips before distributing them to the appropriate players. The players
could either accept or reject the offers they received. Each player
could accept at most one coalition offer. In order to form a winning
coalition, acceptance, by all potential coalition members was required.
Furthermore, in determining a winning coalition, any player's proposal,
if accepted, was considered to have priority over any offer he might
accept, thus committing him to his own offer. The experimenter announced
winning coalitions and notified the coalition members in writing of the
number of points they had obtained for that. trial.
Before every session, a practice trial was conducted to insure
understanding of the rules and procedures. In this practice trial,
each player was given identical resources and only three-person coalitions
had enough votes to win.
Instructions. Each player was completely informed of his own
resources, those of the other players, and all possible winning coalitions.
A tape-recording of the game instructions was played while subjects read
a typewritten copy. To provide an incentive for subjects to attempt to
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maxittiize their outcomes, subjects in all conditions were advised that
they would receive a small sum of money based upon their perfox-mance
(number of poiats won) during the game.
Reference groups were manipulated by re-wording a portion of the
instructions which pertained to the determination of each player's
payoff. Half of the groups in each game condition received the following
instructions, designed to elicit a reference group composed of the players
in the present group:
. . .The more points you win, the more money you will receive.
A conversion scale will be used to determine how much money you
receive, but it will not be based on one cent for one point.
The r«aaining subjects, however, were told that their payoffs depended
on their performance relative to the performance of players in other
groups. Thus, the following instructions established a reference group
of other strong players for each of the powerful players and a reference
group of other weak players for the weaker players in the group:
. . .The more points you win, the more money you will receive.
However, the conversion scale to determine how much money you
receive will not be the same for each person; i.e., the number
of points you win will be compared with the performance of
other subjects in the same position as you . Thus, the con-
version from points to money will depend upon your position
{in the game)
.
Substitution of this single passage was the only difference in the two
sets of instructions.
After the final trial, all subjects r*<reived a writcen -explanation
of the purposes of the expej:i«ent and questions -»*"* comments were
invited. Spirited discussions were quite coroto», indicating active
interest in the proceedings.
..
><; •
. ....
-...
•*•
.
-.
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Results
As a test of differences in coalition frequencies, the group was
used as the unit of observation and the frequency of each of the 7
coalitions in each group was converted to arc sins. A 3 x 2 x 7 (games
by reference group by coalitions) analysis of variance (with repeated
measures on coalitions) was performed on the arc sin values. Since the
frequency of coalitions in each group must sum to 12 (the number of
trials) , the main effects of game type and reference group could not
have been significant in this analysis. Hence, the critical tests in
this analysis were the main effect of coalitions and the interactions
between coalitions with game type and with reference group. The only
significant effect was the main effect of coalitions: F (6, 216) = 45.70,
£ < .01. Tables 2 and 3 show the frequencies of each coalition and the
mean reward division, for the three games and in the two reference group
conditions, respectively. These data represent the means and frequencies
pooled over 7 groups and 12 trials. The three-way coalition involving
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here
the strongest person (ABC, A3D, and ACD) occurred infrequently; hence,
these coalitions have been combined and are denoted AXX.
The six degrees of freedom for the main effect of coalitions were
partitioned into several planned comparisons; only two of these compar-
isons were significant: BCD vs. (AB, AC, and AD): F (1, 216) = 15.39,
£ < .01 and AXX vs. all others: F (1, 216) = 80.71, £ < .01. These
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results indicate that two-way coalitions were more frequent than three-
way coalitions, but no particular two-way coalition was more frequent
than any of the others.
With regard to the division of rewards, Table 4 shows the mean
outcome of Player A, the strongest player, in each of the six conditions.
The strong player's mean outcomes were analysed in a 3 X 2 X 3 (games by
reference group by trial blocks) analysis of variance. The only significant
Insert Table 4 about here
effect was the reference group main effect: J? (1, 36) = 9.10, p_ < .01.
When the strong player's reference group was other strong players, he
received higher outcomes than when his reference group was weaker
players in his own group. This analysis included only those trials
where A was included in the winning coalition. The same results were
found, however, in an analysis of A's payoffs for all trials, including
outcomes of zero when he was excluded from the winning coalition)
.
Tests of Four Theories
There are several possible ways to compare the relative validity
of the four theories, but all of these procedures have serious problems,
especially with regard to the statistical analysis of the data. Hence,
in comparing the validities of these theories, we have been forced to adopt
a "piecemeal" approach based on various criteria of comparison.
.
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Coalition Frequency . With regard to the accuracy of predicting
the coalitions which are likely to form (Table 3), Minimum Power theory
is clearly inadequate. It predicts that the Weak-Union (BCD) should
form in all three games and this coalition occurred infrequently.
Hence, Minimum Power theory can be immediately rejected and will not
be considered in the following presentation.
To compare the remaining theories with regard to predicting coalition
frequencies, the following index was used:
D
f 2n
where 0, and P, denote the observed and predicted frequencies of each
coalition, n denotes the number of trials, and the summation is over the
seven possible coalitions. The desirable property of this index is that
when D_ = 1.0, all predictions are in error and when D. = 0, all predic-
tions are correct.
The vectors of predicted frequencies for coalitions (AB, AC, AD,
BCD, ABC, ABD, and ACD) for 12 trials are: (1) Minimum Resource theory:
(0, 0, 0, 12, 0, 0, 0) in 9(8-3-3-3), (0, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0) in 9(8-7-1-1),
and (4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0) in 15(8-7-7-7); (2) Bargaining theory:
(4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0) in both 9(8-3-3-3) and in 15(8-7-7-7), and
(0, 6, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0) in 9(8-7-1-1); and (3) Weighted Probability
model: (24/7, 24/7, 24/7, 12/7, 0, 0, 0) in all three games. The
predicted frequencies of the Weighted Probability model are based on
the fact that it specifies the exact probability of each coalition; in
all three games, it predicts that the probability of each of the two-way
coalitions should be 2/7 and the probability of the BCD coalition should be 1/7.
'
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Insert Table 5 about here
For each theory separately, a 3 x 2 x 3 (games by reference group
by trial blocks) analysis of variance was used to analyze the D, values.
In all of these analyses, the main effects and the interactions for ref-
erence group and for trials were not significant; hence, the data were
collapsed over these variables.
Though the three analyses were not independent (since they were
based on the same set of observations) , they were conducted primarily to
identify the weaknesses of each theory. Table 5 shows the mean D f values
for the three games, pooled over trials and reference group conditions.
For Minimum Resource theory, the only significant effect was the main
effect of games: F (2, 36) - 35.88, p < .01. Table 5 shows that this
effect can be attributed to the large T> value in 9(8-3-3-3). Minimum
Resource theory predicts that the Weak-Union (BCD) is likely to form in
this game, but this coalition did not form very often (see Table 2).
This suggests that this theory fares poorly in a situation where the
"cheapest winning" coalition was not the Weak-Union. In the other two
games, the "cheapest winning" coalition was not the Weak-Union and the
predictions of the theory for coalition frequency were relatively accurate.
Similarly, the main effect of games was found to be significant for
Bargaining theory: F(2, 36) = 6.82, p < .01. Table 5 shows that this
effect can be attributed to the large value of Df in 9(8-7-1-1). Bar-
gaining theory predicts that the (8-1) coalition (AC, AD) should have
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formed in this game. The theory cannot account for the relatively large
frequencies of the AB and BCD coalitions. It should be noted, however,
that Bargaining theory does not make as strong a prediction in the 9(3-7-1-1)
game as it does in the other two games. Finally,, for the Weighted Probability
model, no significant effects were found. This indicates that this model
was equally accurate in predicting coalition frequencies across the three
games and for the two reference group levels.
With regard to the relative validity of the three models, the mean D_
values can be compared with an Equal Probability (Base Rate) model which
predicts that all coalitions are equally likely. The last column of
Table 5 shows the D values for such a model. For each game, pooled
across the two levels of reference groups, each of these theoretical
models, including the Equal Probability model, was tested against each
other, a pair at a time. These pairwise tests were based on F-tests
with 1 and 12 df's each (equivalent to t-tests for correlated means,
with N = 14 g oups) . Across each row of Table 5, valuer with a common
subscript indicate that the pairwise comparisons were not significantly
different from one another. The Weighted Probability model was at least
as accurate as Bargaining theory in the 9(8-3-3-3) game, more accurate
than any of the other models in the 9(8-7-1-1) game, and along with
Minimum Resource theory and Bargaining theory, more accurate than the
Equiprobability model in the 15(8-7-7-7) game. Bargaining theory was a
poor predictor only in the 9(8-7-1-1) game. Again, this result should
be tempered by the theory's weak prediction for this game. Minimum
resource theory surpassed the Equiprobability model only in the 9(8-7-7-7)
game.
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Comparisons Based on the Strong Player's Outcomes . For the reward
division data, the analysis focussed on the discrepancy between the pre-
dicted and observed outcomes for the strong player. Each of the models
made similar predictions for the reward division for the BCD coalition;
all closely approximate an equal division except Minimum Resource theory,
which predicts a 78-11-11 division for the BCD coalition in the 9(8-7-1-1)
game. The previous analysis of frequencies, however, indicated that this
was an infrequent coalition. In addition, when the BCD coalition did form
in the 9(8-7-1-1) game, the mean payoff division (see Table 2) was much
closer to an equal division than to Minimum Resource theory's prediction.
The differences between the observed and predicted outcomes of the
strong player (when he was included in the winning coalition) were analyzed
Insert Table 6 about here
in 3 x 2 x 3 (games by reference group by trial blocks) analyses of
variance for each of the models individually. Although each of the
model's predictions were mere accurate in the later trials than they
were in the early trials, none of the effects for trials were signifi-
cant. After pooling over trials, the analysis revealed significant
main effects for reference group for each of the models and signifi-
cant main effects for games for Minimum Resource theory and the Weighted
Probability model (see Table 6) . The results for reference group support
theoretical expectations: When a competitive motivation is induced (i.e.,
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when reference groups are manipulated to result in comparisons to other
similar players) , the predictions, which are based on the assumption that
each of the players are competitively motivated, are more accurate.
The main effects for games yielded several interesting findings.
Minimum Resource theory's predictions were relatively poor in each of
the games, and especially poor in the 15(8-7-7-7) game. The fact that
the main effect for games was significant for the Weighted Probability
model is damaging, for it treats the three games as if they were equiv-
alent. Finally, while Bargaining Theory's predictions were relatively
good for each of the games, its worst prediction came in the game where
it makes the weakest prediction.
Demands . An analysis of the players' demands was undertaken to
further explicate the dynamics of the bargaining process. Two sets of
analyses were performed: one for the strong player and the other for
the weak players. A 3 x 2 x 3 (games by reference group by trial blocks)
analysis of variance was performed for the strong player's demands. The
results revealed significant effects for reference group and for trial
blocks. His demands were larger when his reference group was other
powerful players (F{1, 39) = 3.4.69, £ < .01), and post hoc tests of the
trials effect (F(2, 51) * 5.40, £ < .01) revealed that his demands increased
significantly from the first to the second trial block and that the subse-
quent increase in the third trial block was not significant.
The analysis for the weaker players involved an additional factor,
the position of the players (B, C, and D) . This analysis resulted in
•
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significant game and trials effects: F,(2, 50) -- 6.73, £ < .01 and
Insert Table 7 about here
F(2, 84) = 6.44, p < .01, respectively. The game by player interaction
was also significant: F(4, 90) - 4.93, £ < .01. The trials effect was
a mirror image of the effect for the strong player: the weak player's
demands dropped significantly from the first to the second trial blocks
and the further drop between the last two trial blocks was not signifi-
cant. The means and the results of the post hoc tests for the two other
effects are shown in Table 7. The weaker players demanded more when
they had seven votes than when they had one or three votes. The post
hoc analysis of the game by player interaction indicated that B (who
held seven votes) demanded more than the other weaker players in the
8-7-1-1 game,
Discussion
The comparison of the four theories indicates that the predictions
of Bargaining theory and the Weighted Probability model are more accurate
than those of Minimum Resource theory and Minimum Power theory. A com-
parison between the two of them { however, reveals that the Weighted Prob-
ability model has a slight advantage in predicting coalition frequencies
and that Bargaining theory has the advantage in predicting the payoff
distribution. The non-significant effect for trials for Bargaining
theory in the analysis of its predictions of the strong player's payoffs
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is damaging evidence. However, the data did show that the predictions
improved over trials (X
T1_4
= -4.20; X
T5_ 8
-1.93: X
12
=
-1-34), as
predicted.
The most intriguing results were the findings which showed that the
strong player demanded more when his reference group was other similar
players than when his reference group was the present group members, and
that he succeeded in reaping greater payoffs and even more frequent inclu-
sion in the winning coalition in this situation. It is understandable
that he would attempt to increase his payoffs by increasing his demands
in this situation, but one would expect that these increased demands
would have resulted in less frequent inclusion in winning coalitions.
One explanation of this finding focuses on the subtle interaction
between the player's reference group and his power. In the "present
group" condition, the weaker players probably compared themselves not
only with each other but also with the strong player within their group.
When their reference group was other weaker players, they no longer had
to compete with someone who held power. For the strong player, the
"present group" induced him to compare himself with weaker players, while
his reference group in the other condition was composed of other powerful
players. The results indicate that when a player's reference group is
composed of other powerful players, he will be more demanding and may
be able to intimidate an opponent whose reference group is composed of
weak players, regardless of his own position of strength. The analysis
of the post-experimental questionnaire responses supported this hypothesis;
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when their reference group was the present group, the weak players felt
that a "fair" payoff division for the two-person, strong-weak coalition
should be 55.4 "for A and 44.6 for themselves, but 60.3 for A and only
39.7 for themselves when their reference group was other similar players.
Paired with the fact that the weaker players began the 12 trials with
identical demands on the first trial (X = 38.7) in ail the conditions,
their interaction with the powerful player seems to have led to a higher
aspiration level when the strong player's aspiration level was low and a
lower aspiration level when the strong player's aspiration level was high.
This finding coincides with those reported by Yukl (1974 a, b) in two-
person bargaining and is consistent with Siegel and Fouraker's (I960)
Level of Aspiration theory of bargaining.
The data collected in this study were much "richer" than the data
reported in earlier coalition studies (cf. Stryker, 1972) based on three-
person groups. In the present study, where one player not only had more
apparent powc e than the other playerr (i.e., he had more resources than
anyone else) , he also had more "real" power than the other players.
While resources did lead to misperceptions of power (for
instance, E made quite large demands in the early trials of the 8-7-1-1
game) , A realized that he had more power than the other players and they
also realized this (again, from the post-experimental questionnaires)
.
These findings, therefore, have greater relevance for the effects of
power than previous studies. In addition, the present study increased
the salience of the power dimension by manipulating the players' reference
-
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group. Although the generalizability of the present findings to other
situations may be tenuous, the use of four or more players in a coalition
situation in order to vary both real and apparent power leads to a more
realistic representation of "real world" power struggles. Studying only
three players restricts games to situations where one player has a veto,
or where the only power differences are apparent and not real (cf
.
,
Kelley and Arrowood, 1960). With four players, however, the use of
power becomes crucial. The weak players can usurp the strong player's
power, but he can also retain it if his strategies are well-founded.
With this in mind, studies of coalition behavior may do well to expand
their horizons from the study of triads to groups of larger sizes.
•
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Table 1 . Coalitions and Reward Division Predicted by Pour Theories
For Three Games.
GAMES
Theory (8-3-3-3) (8-7-1-1) (8-7-7-7)
Pivotal Power
Shapley (1954)
3-3-3
(33-33-33)
7-1-1
(33-33-33)
7-7-7
(33-33-33)
Minimum Resource
Gamson (1961)
3-3-3
(33-33-33)
8-
(89-
•1 7-1-1
or
-11) (78-11-11)
8-7
(53-47)
Bargaining Theory
Komorita and
Chertkoff (1973)
8-3
(69-31) T
8-1
(73-27) +
8-7
(61-38) +
Weighted Probability
Komorita (1974)
8-3
(67-33)
8-7 or 8-1
(67-33)
8-7
(67-33)
The predicted payoff divisions are the payoffs predicted for the nth trial.
Bargaining Theory does predict changes in the payoffs over time.
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Table 2 . Coalition Frequencies (f) cad Mean Division or Rewards in Three
Games. (Data are pooled over reference group conditions and
over 12 trials)
Possible Coalitions
Games AB AC AD BCD AXX*
f 38 45 49 26 10
9(8-3-3-3)
Div. 69-31 65-35 29-31 34-33-33 44-28-28
f 43 32 62 29 2
9(8-7-1-1)
Div. 54-46 74-26 62-38 38-32-31 47-32-21
f 46 42 47 26 7
15(8-7-7-7)
Div. 60-40 62-38 59-41 34-33-33 35-31-34
% .25 .24 .31 .17 .04
Combined
•
Div.
i
60-40
1
66-34 63-37 35-33-32 41-29-30
Denotes coalition of strongest player and any two of weaker players; none of
the four theories predict that AXX should occur.
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Table^ 3 . Coalition Frequencies aad Mean Division of Rewards for Two Levels of
Reference Group (Data are pooled over three games and 12 trials)
.
Reference Group AB
Possible Coalitions
AC AD BCD
-——
—
-"""
--"-I
AXX*
f
Present Group
Div.
59
56-44
62 85
66-34 58-42
40
35-33-32
6
57-22-21
f
Similar Other
Div.
68
66-34
57 73
66-34 68-32
41
35-33-32
13
33-33-34
* Denotes three-way coalition of strongest player and any two of the weaker players
(ABC, ABD, and ACD) . None of the theories predict that AXX will occur.
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Table 4 . Mean Outcome of Strongest Player (A) When Included in the Winning Coalition
(frequency of inclusion shown in parentheses)
.
,
_
Games
Reference Group 9(8-3-3-3) 9(8-7-1-1) 15(8-7-7-7) Mean
Present Group 59.4 (68) 61.2 (72) 54.1 (78) 58.2
Similar Others 71.7 (74) 62.1 (67) 62.6 (71) 65.5
Mean 65.6 61.7 58.4
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Table; 5 . Mean Values of D for Three Theories and for an Equal Probability
(Base Rate) Model.
1
—
Theoretical Models
Games Min. Resource Bargaining Wtd. Prob. Equal Prob.
9(8-3-3-3} .845
c
.345
a
.342
a
.514.b
9(8-7-1-1) .434.
a
.512,b .344a b
15(8-7-7-7) .274
a
.274
a
.229
a
. 461.b
Note : Cells with common subscripts within each game are not significantly different
from one another at the .05 level of significance using the Newman-KueIs procedure.
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Table 7 . Mean Demands of the Weaker Players for Three Games*
1
'
.
.
Games
1
Player** 9(8-3-3-3) 9(8-7-1-1) 15(8-7-7-7)
-
B 32.26,_b 40.82a
38.69
.
ab
C,D 33.94,_b
31.36.
o
38.91
,
ab
X 33.38,
D
34.51.b 38.84a
*Cells with common subscripts, within each main effect and each interaction,
are not significantly different from one another at the .05 level using the
Newman-Kuels orocedure.
**The demandt. of players C and D, w?k had identical resources in each
of the games, were analyzed both together and separately with no appreciable
difference in results.







